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Introduction 
 
Product counterfeiting is a long-established criminal pursuit that has increased at 
an exponential rate in recent times, so much so that the trade in counterfeit goods is 
estimated to account for anything up to 7 per cent of world trade, equivalent to 
$500 billion (see Yar, 2005; 2008). This includes a burgeoning global trade in 
‘fake’ medicines. With the advent of the Internet and e-commerce – increasingly 
seen as the cornerstone of the new global social and economic order (Castells, 
2001) – this market has expanded significantly. It is estimated that the ‘fake’ medi-
cine trade alone has increased by 90 per cent since 2005, with an approximate 
turnover of $200 billion (IRACM, 2013: 16). However, despite resultant criminal 
profits, as well as social and physical harms, the illegal online trade of medicines 
has received little scholarly attention, and research and preventative action remain 
largely ineffective. 
 The aim of the present chapter is to provide an original empirical account of the 
tactics and methods illegal entrepreneurs employ in order to market medicines 
online while avoiding being detected by law enforcements agencies and health 
regulatory authorities. The chapter is based primarily  ̶  although not exclusively  ̶  
on our research in the UK, which is part of the FAKECARE project: a European 
Commission–funded project that aims to develop expertise that can help appropri-
ate agencies to tackle the online trade of ‘fake’ medicines by, among other things, 
providing an in-depth knowledge of the supply and demand dimensions of this 
criminal market.  
 Following the introduction, the chapter is organised into five sections. The first 
section briefly outlines the broader context of the trade in illicit medicines. The 
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second section focuses on the infrastructure required in order to trade in medicines 
online. In the third section, we offer a description of the methodology adopted to 
explore the phenomenon. In the fourth section we focus on the findings: firstly we 
concentrate on the online tactics illicit entrepreneurs use to market their merchan-
dise; and secondly we offer an account of the ways in which entrepreneurs trading 
in medicines online attempt to avoid detection by law enforcement and regulatory 
agencies. The chapter finishes with a discussion and analysis of our overall find-
ings. 
 
 
The broader context of the illicit medicine trade 
 
The nature and specifics of the chapter’s objectives demands some preliminary 
contextualisation of the illegal trade in medicines. The ‘fake’ medicine trade can be 
categorised according to three distinct ‘business’ models that work across different 
sites, scales and networks:  
1. ‘Entities’ trading exclusively offline in the ‘real’ world;  
2. ‘Entities’ that were originally involved in the trade offline, but have now moved 
online to distribute their merchandise;  
3. ‘Entities’ that focus their skills exclusively in the virtual world.  
 
One specific example of the latter is Glavmed, which has been described as “one of 
the most significant cases of cybercrime in the pharmaceutical sector” (IRACM, 
2013: 70); a case we will return to in our analysis below. In this chapter we will 
focus primarily on the second and third models, whereby business is conducted 
either in part, or solely, online. Having said that, it is important to challenge the 
false dichotomy existing between online and offline processes involved in the for-
mulation, manufacture and distribution of ‘fake’ medicines. Indeed, the online 
trade includes crucial offline dimensions. Here, we support the work of Guarnieri 
and Przyswa, who draw on the work of Sassen (2007), to argue that online and 
offline domains are not hybridised, but are interconnected with distinct characteris-
tics (Guarnieri and Przyswa, 2013: 219). 
 Furthermore, there is an on-going debate surrounding the definition of ‘fake’ 
medicines. For reasons of economy in the chapter we use the term ‘fake’ to con-
note: 
 
 Counterfeit medicines:  
Here we adopt the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) definition: “А counterfeit 
medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to 
identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both branded and generic 
products and counterfeit products may include products with the correct ingredi-
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ents or with the wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient 
active ingredients or with fake packaging” (WHO, 2012). 
 
 Falsified medicines:  
Part of the debate regarding the definition of ‘fake’ medicines relates to the separa-
tion of counterfeits from the market in substandard and unlicensed generic drugs. 
For this reason the European Commission prefers to distinguish between counter-
feit and falsified medicines. Whereas counterfeits are those infringing intellectual 
property (IP) rights, falsified medicines are any fakes attempting to pass them-
selves off as an authentic medicine. The term falsification, therefore, moves be-
yond merely legal-economic terms relating to copyright infringement and embeds 
public health and the ‘sticky subject’ of generics in the definition (see IRACM, 
2013: 14). 
 
 Legally produced yet illegally supplied medicines:  
One of the problems facing those involved in preventing the global trade in coun-
terfeit medicines is the varied IP rights and licensing laws operating over different 
jurisdictional boundaries. This includes variations across European states, where 
trademark infringement in one country may differ in another. On occasion, traders 
dealing in generics or various branded products produced abroad yet sold in the 
UK seek to by-pass existing IP laws and patents; these products may have been 
legally produced but are illegally supplied. For example, in the UK legitimate ge-
nerics are licensed and, therefore, authorised as copies of a once patented and 
branded drug. However, when a patent expires an opening in the market for genu-
ine and fake generics is created (see Chan, 2013): the most recent example in the 
UK being Viagra (sildenafil citrate) in 2013. Fakes in this instance can be counter-
feits falsely claiming to be the branded product, or unlicensed products claiming to 
contain the identical active ingredients found in the formerly branded/patented 
product. One example is that of Kamagra, a sildenafil citrate based erectile dys-
function (ED) drug legally produced in India, which is not licensed in the UK. Dur-
ing our research we found a variety of online sites offering this product for sale as 
‘Generic Viagra’ to UK customers. There is also a growing market of legally pro-
duced yet illegally supplied medicines entering the legitimate pharmaceutical sup-
ply chain (Yar, 2012). 
  
 
Infrastructure required for online trading (of medicines) 
 
In order to identify the tactics used by illegal online traders in pharmaceuticals we 
must first consider the infrastructure required for online sales of medicines (alt-
hough this is the infrastructure that is necessary for any type of e-commerce). An 
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obvious primary component of the infrastructure is an internet service provider. An 
internet service provider is an organisation that provides services for accessing, 
using, or participating in the Internet. Internet service providers may be organised 
as commercial, community-owned, non-profit, or otherwise privately owned enti-
ties (e.g. Virgin Media, BT and Sky in the UK, Freenet AG and T-Online in Ger-
many, Claranet and NLnet in the Netherlands, etc.). 
 Secondly, a registrar is an important node in the system. The Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) accredits commercial entities 
called ‘registrars’ that are authorised to sell domain names to the public. A very 
popular example is GoDaddy.com. Registrars are compelled to follow the law in 
their everyday business and are obliged to shut down illegal online pharmacies by 
suspending and ‘locking’ the domain name, therefore, ensuring that it is not trans-
ferred to another member of the public. A registrar that is found to be accepting 
fees from known illegal online pharmacies is considered to be a participant in the 
criminal activity. However, registrars respond to notifications from law enforce-
ment authorities in various ways. Some cooperate, whereas others do not and are 
deemed non-compliant registrars. 
 Thirdly, a payment processor is required. A payment processor is a company 
(often a third party) appointed by a merchant to handle credit card transactions 
for merchants’ acquiring banks. Payment processors enable the merchants to re-
ceive debit or credit card payments online by providing a connection to 
an acquiring bank. These processors perform a number of functions, which include 
evaluating whether transactions are valid and approved, and providing anti-fraud 
measures to assure that a purchase transaction is initiated by the source it claims to 
be. An established payment processor is, for instance, Mastercard. 
 Fourthly, payment gateways are a vital part of the process. They send credit 
card transactions to the payment processors, who are appointed to handle transac-
tions with the acquiring bank. Significantly, payment gateways encrypt merchant 
and customer information during e-commerce transactions and offer secure pages. 
Registrars, payment processors and payment gateways are integral nodes of the 
infrastructure needed to trade in ‘fake’ medicines online, so much so that law en-
forcement consider them as the ‘choke points’ of the process (Burke, 2014); points 
that, if adequately controlled, can result in the closure of illegal online pharmacies. 
 Finally, an important part of the infrastructure is a postal delivery service, 
which guarantees that the merchandise traded online reaches customers in the ‘real’ 
world. This is one aspect of the infrastructure that largely involves legitimate com-
panies (the large courier firm FedEx was recently indicted in the USA on charges 
of conspiracy to deliver illicit pharmaceuticals; see Walker 2014).  
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Methods and data 
 
As part of our broader exploration of the supply and demand of ‘fake’ medicines 
online, a number of methods and sources were used to provide an account of the 
tactics illegal traders in pharmaceutical products employ in order to, firstly, market 
their merchandise online and, secondly, avoid the efforts of law enforcement agen-
cies to prevent the trade. The methodology included a virtual ethnography. Tradi-
tionally, ethnographies were established as a means by which anthropologists and 
sociologists could explore cultural groups by using the technique of ‘participant 
observation’. Observing and engaging with a specific group over an extended peri-
od of time allowed ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973), which both described and 
contextualised human behaviour and everyday experiences, actions and environ-
ments. In the present-day context, however, where everyday life for many includes 
a significant proportion of time spent in virtual communities, ethnography and 
social research more generally has been compelled to account for the multi-sited, 
mobile and transnational nature of modern social, cultural, political and economic 
life. Traditionally, local ethnographic research sites have therefore been expanded 
to analyse global, ‘glocal’, transnational and virtual sites (see Wittel, 2000). 
Whether in forums, blogs or social networking sites, social processes and patterns 
of communication take place in a new ‘sphere’ established by the Internet (Fielding 
et al., 2008: 161). This requires from the ethnographer a methodology able to offer 
insights into the virtual worlds we regularly inhabit. What is typically labelled ‘vir-
tual ethnography’ or ‘netnography’ has steadily increased in usage to offer re-
searchers finely detailed insights into virtual communities (see for example Davey 
et al., 2012; Fox et al., 2005; Hine, 2000; Ward, 1999). 
 Primary data was collected via the virtual ethnography in both non-reactive and 
reactive ways (see Fielding et al, 2008). Initially, research began with a period of 
non-participant observation (sometimes referred to as ‘lurking’), whereby observa-
tions were made in public forums and social networking sites without direct inter-
action with users. This was an invaluable primary stage of data collection that gave 
us the opportunity to familiarise ourselves with such a mass of information and 
specific interactions. Screenshots of images and text from forums, online pharma-
cies, social networking sites and classified advertising were collected. Moreover, 
social media and forum profiles, and email accounts were established in order to 
interact with users and take part in discussions with online consumers and suppliers 
of medicines. Just as Webber and Yip found in their analysis of ‘carding’ and the 
online trade in fake credit cards, internet forums are a largely untapped resource of 
empirical criminological research (Webber and Yip, 2013: 193). 
 In terms of selecting forums to enter, a literature review and online searches via 
Google were undertaken to identify forums that related to specific topics with links 
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(unintended or otherwise) to pharmaceutical consumption. Namely: health forums, 
bodybuilding, sleep, weight loss, pro-anorexia, mental health, sexual health, men’s 
and women’s health, general forums with keyword searches, drug forums and their 
prescription drug sections, and pregnancy and motherhood. Active participation 
followed and conversations were generated in these forums, as well as social net-
working sites – including Facebook and Twitter - and email discussion. It would be 
impossible to research the entirety of the web. Therefore, decisions were made to 
enter networks and online communities that appeared or claimed to primarily cover 
UK contexts over certain periods of time. This was decided after general searches, 
observations and discussions as to the most appropriate forums that individual us-
ers would utilise to discuss their experiences of buying and consuming specific 
prescription drugs. Thus such online networks and communities would be more 
likely to reveal information relating to the locations and identities of the pharma-
ceutical products’ suppliers. 
 With regards to the supply side of the online trade in illicit medicines, this 
method was used to collect data from various online sellers and sites, which was 
then analysed, pooled and categorised in order to look for common patterns. This 
included posing as customers and interacting with sellers online in order to collect 
a number of specific details from a range of online sites. The virtual ethnography 
allowed us to collect rich data from online sites used for supply and to begin to 
analyse the networks that have proliferated throughout the various stages of the 
trade that caters for consumer demand in the UK. 
 However, there are limits to the utility of a virtual ethnography as an isolated 
method in this context. For instance, the researcher can only pool information that 
is openly available online. Moreover, illicit medicines are also physically traded, 
therefore, the distribution of the physical goods also requires investigation. For 
these reasons we also collected data from a range of other sources in order to trian-
gulate the findings and offer richer and more comprehensive empirical evidence. 
Data from judicial and investigative cases, interviews with relevant stakeholders 
and enforcement officers, and secondary media and academic sources were gath-
ered and analysed. Specifically, we collected data from the UK Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), National Crime Agency (NCA), 
Interpol and LegitScript2. This involved semi-structured interviews and general 
discussions with experts in these organisations in the UK and Europe. For example, 
we interviewed analysts at Interpol’s Medical Product Counterfeiting and Pharma-
ceutical Crime Sub-Directorate, a head analyst at the UK’s National Cyber Crime 
Unit responsible for ‘shutting down’ illegal online pharmacies, and the head of 
enforcement for the MHRA. Experts also provided us with some quantitative data. 
The NCA provided data regarding known illegal online pharmacies, which includ-
                                                          
2  LegitScript is a verification and monitoring service for online pharmacies.  
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ed information on domain names, registrars and registrants. The MHRA provided 
us with statistics relating to seizures of counterfeit medicines during raids from 
2009-2014. We also gained access to ten investigative and judicial case files relat-
ing to online pharmaceutical crime at the MHRA. The above data have been used, 
alongside our ethnographic research, to build an accurate picture of the online trade 
in ‘fake’ medicines and, in the context of this chapter’s objectives, to begin to ana-
lyse the tactics used by cyber-criminal entrepreneurs involved in the trade.  
 In addition, we attended the two-day workshop of the ‘Pangea’ Single Points of 
Contact (SPoCs) at INTERPOL’s headquarters in Lyon in March 2014, where rep-
resentatives of law enforcement agencies (police and customs), health regulatory 
agencies (including the MHRA) and representatives of the private sector (for ex-
ample Mastercard, Microsoft and LegitScript) were present to discuss various as-
pects of the ‘Pangea’ operation. This is an annual international operation that began 
in 2008, which takes place for one week and is specifically aimed at tackling the 
online trade in illicit medicines. ‘Pangea’ is coordinated by INTERPOL, the World 
Customs Organisation, the Permanent Forum of International Pharmaceutical 
Crime (PFIPC), the Heads of Medicines Agencies Working Group of Enforcement 
Officers (HMA WGEO), the pharmaceutical industry and the electronic payments 
industry. During the two-day workshop we obtained data from presentations and 
informal interviews with individuals from the aforementioned agencies and organi-
sations, as well as from unpublished manuals and reports used by the authorities in 
various countries. 
 Finally, we collected data via traditional ethnographic methods. The offline 
ethnography was conducted in a gym in the Northeast of England in which the use 
and trade of anabolic steroids is widespread. At this point it should be mentioned 
that this particular locale has one of the highest rates of steroid use in the UK (see 
Kean, 2012). Within the context of this ethnographic research, we had the oppor-
tunity to acquire knowledge regarding a variety of illegal activities and, most im-
portantly for this chapter, the use and (online) trade of anabolic steroids. To a con-
siderably lesser extent, data were also collected in relation to other performance-
enhancing substances. Interviews were conducted as free-flowing conversations 
with participants on a series of occasions between January 2014 and July 2014. 
Most of the interviews were quite informal and brief, in which a few questions 
were asked yet usable data was received (see Schwalbe and Wolkomir, 2003). This 
data was simply recorded in notebooks because the use of a tape-recorder was, on 
most occasions, impractical.  
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Findings 
 
a.  Marketing tactics  
 
Online Pharmacies 
 
The primary site for medicine supply online is Online Pharmacies (OPs). OPs are 
pharmacies that operate over the Internet and post their products to consumers via a 
shipping company or the postal service. There are various types of online pharma-
cies and, with the global and detached nature in which they operate, the distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate operations can often become blurred. Outside 
legitimate online pharmacies a range of illegitimate pharmacies are in operation. 
Legitimate online pharmacies include well-known pharmacy chains’ online subsid-
iaries and independent pharmacies’ online sites set up to simplify the ordering pro-
cess and compete with larger companies. However, there are huge numbers of ille-
gitimate OPs in operation. In order to identify illicit providers a number of com-
mon indicators can illustrate whether online sites are acting illegally. Most offer 
what should be prescription only (PO) medicines without a prescription, whereas 
others offer forged online prescription services which simply ask the customer to 
‘virtually discuss’ their supposed health concerns with someone posing as an 
online doctor. Other obvious ways to tell if an OP is acting illegitimately is the 
concealment of their physical address and the webpage’s connection to a non-
compliant registrar. To project the appropriate image and enhance credibility ille-
gal entrepreneurs pay particular attention to the design of the website, providing 
scientific information on the issue, accompanied by photographs of health profes-
sionals. In addition, these websites are embellished with extremely detailed Fre-
quently Asked Questions (FQA) sections as another indication of reliability. In 
2008 the UK introduced the green cross logo in order to offer legitimacy and to 
help UK consumers identify authentic online pharmacies. However, some rogue 
pharmacies have attempted to plagiarise the logo on their sites.  
 
Use of Social Media Sites 
 
The virtual ethnographic research revealed numerous examples of social media 
sites, particularly Facebook, acting as online sites for supply of illicit medicines. 
Connections between seller and buyer were forged via friends’ lists and Facebook 
groups affiliated to prescription drugs, or linked to subcultures wherein prescrip-
tion drug use is prevalent and normalised. ‘Friends’ tended to post stock available 
directly on their wall or on the page of a group, often with photographic evidence 
of the product alongside their personal or business name, their contact details and 
the date (see figure 1). Virtual ‘word of mouth’ plays an important role in terms of 
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establishing, assuring and circulating the legitimacy of a seller and quality of the 
service on offer, especially as users are concerned about becoming victims of 
‘scams’ and subsequently being defrauded. Some actors used a variety of social 
networking sites to advertise their products. For example, we also found evidence 
of opioids and erectile dysfunction drugs for sale via sellers posting on sites such as 
Instagram and Twitter. 
 
Figure 1. 
Stock posted to the page of a Facebook group, March 2013. 
 
 
   Source: authors’ research 
 
Participatory web cultures and social media sites allow for a process of ‘prosump-
tion’ (Toffler, 1980) in ‘fake’ pharmaceutical trading, where often there is no clear 
demarcation between the producer, trader and consumer involved in marketing and 
advertising processes. This, we are quite convinced, is further evidence of a cultur-
al shift in consumption  ̶  and business relations - more generally and suggests that 
the online market in ‘fake’ pharmaceuticals is an important example of this shift. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs use a variety of online sites/avenues (email, Facebook, 
OPs) interchangeably to market their products, usually bought in bulk from distrib-
utors. For example, initial links made between buyers and sellers on social media 
sites can direct buyers to OPs and/or lead to more detailed email conversations 
about the products. This also explains why particular sellers offer free samples or 
added extras in order to market specific products they have in stock and need to 
sell. Other actors using social media are small scale amateur sellers, sometimes 
also users/consumers of prescription drugs, a procedure that seems to mimic the 
‘real’ street-level dealers involved in illicit drug distribution.  
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Online Wholesalers and Classified Advertising 
 
We found two specific online marketplaces based in Asia selling large quantities of 
pharmaceutical chemicals, materials, equipment or finished medicinal products to 
distributors and consumers. These products are attempting to bypass IP laws and 
are therefore deemed as ‘fake’. These sites offer B2B and direct B2C platforms for 
trade in ‘fake’ medicines. Alibaba is one of the largest e-commerce markets in the 
world, so big that in 2012 the site processed the selling of more goods than Ama-
zon and eBay combined (The Economist, 2013). However, it is also rife with coun-
terfeit products. We found large quantities of powdered APIs (Active Pharmaceuti-
cal Ingredients) under their generic names. For example, Zopiclone, a non-
benzodiazepine, a patented product with Sanofi Aventis for sale in the UK, being 
sold in powdered form in 25 kilo quantities direct from a chemical company based 
in mainland China. Moreover, the equipment needed to press pills at home was 
also for sale on the site. 
 TradeIndia, an online Indian based B2B portal, was another large online mar-
ketplace illegitimately offering direct sales of pharmaceutical products under patent 
in the UK. We found direct evidence of a seller on Facebook who was supplied by 
a TradeIndia seller. In this case the ingredients/chemicals and pressing and packag-
ing were being supplied to small clandestine operations based in the UK. Further-
more, we found classified advertising via such sites as Craigslist being used to sell 
smaller quantities of ‘fake’ medicines. We found Oxycontin, Ritalin and Percocet 
among others for sale, mainly in the ‘Health and Beauty’ section. Further still, a 
variety of sites posing as UK-based online pharmaceutical wholesalers offered 
‘special products’, which suggests that goods and services lying at the margins of 
legitimacy are being advertised. This may feed the ‘new breed of retail drug dealer’ 
sourcing their stock – in this case prescription drugs - online (see Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu, 2014). 
 
‘Pandora’s (in)box’: E-mail and spam 
 
Another way illegal pharmacies promote their business and merchandise online is 
through the use of spam e-mails. One of the most prolific counterfeit medicine 
traders online known to the authorities is the Russian-based GlavMed. They run 
their online pharmacy operation alongside their large spam company SpamIt. Ac-
cording to M86 Security Labs, the sites advertised in Glavmed/Spamit emails  ̶  
best known by their “Canadian Pharmacy” brand name ̶ were by far the most 
prevalent affiliate brands promoted by spam as of June 2010 (Krebs on Security, 
2011) (see figure 2). In addition, after researching 218 drug related queries over 
nine months in 2010-2011, cybersecurity researchers at Carnegie Mellon Universi-
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ty found that illegal pharmacies use spam e-mails to manipulate web search results 
and promote their business (Medical Daily, 2011). 
 
Figure 2. 
Affiliate brands promoted by spam, June 2010 
 
 
Source: Kerbs on Security (2011) 
 
The practice of using spam e-mails has been used  ̶  primarily by illegal entrepre-
neurs with the highest IT ‘literacy’ - in conjunction with another practice: web 
manipulation. Web manipulation has been viewed as much more efficient a method 
than spam e-mails. As the lead researcher of the project at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity noted, “. . . unauthorised online pharmacies have been using e-mail spam to 
tap the wallets of unwary online consumers but that method did not blanket enough 
customers so now [the illegal entrepreneurs] are infecting websites to redirect un-
wary consumers to hundreds of illegal online pharmacies” (Science Daily, 2011). 
Specifically, they found that one-third of their collected search results during the 
study  ̶  7000 infected websites   ̶ triggered an active redirect to a few hundred ille-
gal online pharmacies sites. Affiliate and sub-affiliate networks often play a crucial 
role in this process, which we will return to below in our discussion of detection 
avoidance tactics. 
 
Forums 
 
There is an abundance of marketing research suggesting that consumers are heavily 
influenced by internet-based forums before they make purchasing decisions (Del-
larocas, 2006). Therefore, entrepreneurs exploit discussions in these forums in the 
knowledge that potential customers tend to be more interested in a product if it is 
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perceived as ‘authentically’ endorsed, rather than a product purposefully promoted 
by marketer-generated sources (Bickart and Schindler, 2001). In a similar vein, 
online forums have been identified as critical and strategic discussion platforms 
allowing for what Woerndl et al. (2008) call ‘viral marketing’: transmitting mes-
sages and information about products quickly to a much wider audience. This can 
be manipulated by criminals involved in the trade who pose as consumers, or more 
directly via the use of affiliates (see discussion below). It also confirms a point we 
made earlier that production and consumption are involved in a process of co-
creation in the context of participatory web cultures and pharmaceutical trading.  
Virtual specialised forums are not only spaces in which illegal entrepreneurs identi-
fy (and persuade) potential customers to purchase medicines for medical conditions 
that concern them, but also in which customers often collectively discuss their 
pharmaceutical consumption online without such persuasion. Moreover, forums 
have also emerged in the form of what Soudijn and Zegers (2012) call ‘conver-
gence setting’ for criminals; locations in which potential collaborators may meet 
one another. Hence, internet-based forums – in an increasingly normalised process 
of time/space compression – provide large numbers of consumers in dispersed 
locations and offer the formation of transient relationships between (cyber)criminal 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The Deep Web 
 
There has been a lot of discussion in the UK media regarding the SilkRoad, an 
unregulated US-based online marketplace recently seized by the FBI. This is only 
one example of operations on the so-called ‘deep web’, which enforcement agen-
cies suspect might proliferate over time. Designed for online anonymity, Tor, or 
The Onion Router, offers layered encryption to buyers and sellers. It is a network 
designed to pass IP addresses and carry out web transactions through numerous 
relays, using random and anonymised URLs in order to conceal users’ locations 
and internet activities. Once Tor is accessed a buyer and seller trade in digital cur-
rencies, such as Bitcoin, and use data encryption and decryption tools, for example 
PGP encryption (Pretty Good Privacy), to encrypt and decrypt messages. This has 
provided distributors of drugs a relatively anonymous and unregulated online mar-
ketplace. Our research has found numerous sellers of prescription-only medicines, 
steroids and other illicit drugs on the deep web across various sites. Clearly, a vari-
ety of online sites and avenues are implicated in the online trade in ‘fake’ medi-
cines. However, along with the online sites of supply, a variety of other channels 
and networks have emerged and developed, through which the trade is put into 
practice, reiterating the importance of a discussion of both the virtual and physical 
elements of the trade and their interconnections, which we will turn to now. 
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Marketing of online business on physical locations 
 
Entrepreneurs also promote their online businesses offline, during pharmaceutical 
conventions and other relevant events and venues. For example, during our offline 
ethnography we came across an illegal entrepreneur, ‘Pete’, a nutritionist by train-
ing, who attended the gym in Northeast England. With his cousin, who is based in 
India, ‘Pete’ owns an illegal pharmacy that sells steroids and a variety of other 
pharmaceutical products to UK and European-based customers. ‘Pete’ also pro-
motes the use and purchase of anabolic steroids in the gym, among individuals who 
are attempting to ‘bulk up’, and especially among those who have been having 
difficulty in doing so. He also promotes his illegal business during local and na-
tional bodybuilding, power-lifting and mixed martial arts events. His professional 
background as a nutritionist not only allows him to offer detailed advice on nutri-
tional matters, but also partly legitimises his illegal business in the gym. ‘Pete’ is 
regularly ‘taxed’ on his profit by the owner of the gym in return for the opportunity 
to market his business on the premises. 
 
Asking for personal details from customers 
 
Finally, entrepreneurs selling ‘fake’ medicines online market their merchandise by 
asking for a phone number when collecting billing information from customers 
making initial orders. The collected numbers are then used to contact customers for 
repeat business. In order to secure a customer’s number, the entrepreneurs make 
the provision of a telephone number compulsory if an online transaction is to be 
completed. Although an initial connection is made online, future sales can then be 
made over the telephone without any online interaction. 
 
b.  Detection avoidance tactics 
 
As mentioned earlier, apart from tactics used to promote their business and mer-
chandise, illegal entrepreneurs use a number of techniques to avoid law enforce-
ment and health regulatory agencies’ efforts to close them down and bring them 
before the courts. Firstly, the tactics involve the use of affiliate and sub-affiliate 
networks to ‘muddy the waters’ (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3. 
Payment gateways in the online trade of counterfeit medicines 
 
Source: Groves (2014) 
 
An afflilate network is constructed in two ways:  1. By entrepreneurs who are 
responsible for a number of websites illegally trading in medicines; often the 
websites have a very similar if not identical template (see figure 4); 2. By the use 
of ‘affiliates’, whereby larger ‘organisations’ operating OPs pay commercial 
entities commission to surf the web and ‘set up clone pages mimicking the website 
of the “spider” and/or merely post a URL link’ on their site to the pharmacy. In 
other words, individuals or affiliate programs run by individuals post links to OPs 
on various online sites and are paid for each ‘customer who has ‘clicked through’ 
the affiliate’s link’ (DeKeiffer, 2005: 9). Therefore, alongside muddying the 
waters, these networks provide a crucial marketing function. 
 Firstly, it is very interesting to note the case of ‘Glavmed’ mentioned earlier. 
This particular criminal enterprise owned and operated 2026 domain names (alt-
hough all of these names used similar website templates), provided by 36 different 
registrars, leading to only 12 payment gateways or pages. Similarly, the Pangea IV 
operation identified 1412 illegal online pharmacies, 928 of which led to payment 
pages. Of those, 649 websites (or approximately 70%) were connected to only 4 
payment pages (see Anaman, 2014). These examples emphasise the presence of 
large-scale, concentrated, schemes involved in the online trade of ‘fake’ medicines. 
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Figure 4 
Illegal online pharmacies belonging to an affiliate network 
 
 
Source: figure provided by the UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA) 
 
 Secondly, illegal entrepreneurs buy their domains from ‘rogue registrars’, such 
as TodayNIC; BizCN; WebNIC.cc.; Joker.com; IPMirror, etc. These non-
compliant registrars tend to ignore law enforcement and regulatory agencies’ re-
quests to block and shut down specific sites deemed to be associated with the ille-
gal sale of medicines. 
 Thirdly, illegal entrepreneurs engage in something similar to counterintelli-
gence. They attempt to identify unusual patterns of ‘behaviour’ on the part of law 
enforcement and health regulatory agents posing as customers. Specifically, they 
check the details of visitors to their affiliate sites, including the frequency of visits 
and the debit/credit card used for purchases. If a visitor is found to be making a 
number of visits to a number of their affiliate sites, as well as using the same card 
for payment, this is an indication of a law enforcement officer or health regulatory 
agent monitoring the website and/or conducting test purchases. If the illegal entre-
preneurs identify such ‘unusual’ behaviour from the ‘fingerprint’ (IP address), the 
‘potential client’ is blocked or re-directed to another website (for example, back to 
Google or to a site unrelated to the pharmaceutical industry). 
 Fourthly, illegal entrepreneurs actively attempt to avoid the WHOIS check that 
is performed by law enforcement authorities and regulatory agencies in order to 
identify illegal online pharmacies. WHOIS checks the following: 1. the company 
acting as the ‘registrar’; 2. the registrant of the domain name (basically the compa-
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ny or individual who has bought the domain name); 3. the registration date; 4. IP 
address; 5. the company address. Law enforcement and health regulatory agents 
use WHOIS services provided by websites such as www.domaintools.com. Accord-
ing to the Permanent Forum on International Pharmaceutical Crime (PFIPC) 
(2014), it can be extremely difficult to track the ultimate source of a website, as 
many of the major illegal pharmacies use ‘fast flux’ in order to hide their physical 
location: 
 
“The simplest type of ‘fast flux’, referred to as ‘single-flux’, is characterised by 
multiple individual nodes within the network registering and de-registering their 
addresses for a single DNS (Domain Name System) name. This creates a con-
stantly changing list of destination addresses for that single DNS name – per-
haps as often as every three minutes. The list can be hundreds or thousands of 
entries long” (PFIPC, 2014: 14). 
 
Fifthly, criminal entrepreneurs re-route payments through intermediaries and thus 
obfuscate the relationships existing between illegal activities and payments (see 
Burke, 2014). Law enforcement and health regulatory agencies consider ‘following 
the money’ as a reliable way of identifying illegal entrepreneurs involved in the 
illicit pharmaceutical trade. Indeed, ‘following the money’ is regarded as a way of 
counterbalancing the limitations of other aspects of the criminal investigation and a 
way of targeting the most important actors involved in a pharmaceutical crime 
network. However, illegal entrepreneurs largely avoid asking for bank payments 
because, on occasion, according to MHRA agents, the name of the beneficiary can 
be obtained from the transaction’s paper trail. Instead, entrepreneurs prefer money 
transfer services (such as Western Union) because they are extremely easy to con-
duct, and – for smaller transactions – no identification is required. In addition, ille-
gal entrepreneurs forge multiple banking relationships in numerous ways. They 
have been known to ask family members, friends and/or acquaintances to borrow 
their accounts for a number of transactions, or have rented the accounts of others 
for a short time. 
 Finally, illegal entrepreneurs generally avoid providing any personal infor-
mation and details on delivery items accompanying the merchandise they send 
(such as delivery notes, invoices, leaflets etc.). Some unsuccessful or not so dili-
gent illicit entrepreneurs use telephone numbers, which is quite a crucial piece of 
information for the investigative authorities. During our research, authorities 
showed us one delivery note sent with a batch of counterfeit Viagra that included 
the following message: “Thank you for your purchase. For more information call 
XXXX 393348”. As a result, the investigative team at the MHRA managed to trace 
a major, but not very intelligent, actor in an illegal online pharmacy operation dis-
tributing their merchandise in the UK. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
   
The ‘fake’ medicine trade is a growing and under-researched global phenomenon 
encompassing instances of counterfeit, substandard, unlicensed and illegally sup-
plied pharmaceutical products. Based on data gathered as part of a broader ongoing 
study investigating the online trade in ‘fake’ medicines, this chapter has outlined a 
range of tactics adopted by illegal entrepreneurs involved in the trade. Specifically, 
the chapter focused on two distinct, although not entirely separate, aspects of our 
findings relating to the tactics and methods used. On the one hand, it offered an 
insight into how ‘fake’ medicines are marketed online. On the other hand, it high-
lighted how the entrepreneurs involved in the trade avoid detection by the authori-
ties. As the chapter has shown, in terms of marketing techniques, online suppliers 
of ‘fake’ medicines use a range of sites  ̶  often simultaneously  ̶  to target their 
market and circulate the value of their products to consumers. These include online 
pharmacies, social media sites, online wholesalers, classified advertising, email and 
spam, online forums, and cryptomarkets found on the deep web; as well as on 
physical locations and via telephone marketing.  
 We have also found that affiliate and sub-affiliate networks can play a crucial 
role in marketing ‘fake’ medicines online (by providing greater market reach) and 
in attempts to avoid detection (by obscuring individual market operations). Fur-
thermore, cyber-criminal entrepreneurs supplying ‘fake’ medicines use a range of 
other common detection avoidance practices. As discussed, they choose non-
compliant registrars to access domain names, monitor the behaviour of visitors to 
their sites, circumvent the WHOIS protocol, re-route payments, and avoid paper 
trails. 
 Although this chapter is empirical in its scope, our investigation into the online 
tactics illegal entrepreneurs employ in order to trade in ‘fake’ medicines online 
allows us to make a number of observations. For the most part these observations 
relate to the ongoing debate surrounding whether modern ICTs have facilitated old 
or produced new forms of criminal activity. This specific illegal market can, there-
fore, be characterised by a tension between logic consequence (the view that pro-
fessional or ‘organised’ criminals become involved in cyber-crime at any given 
opportunity) and pragmatism (the view that questions the need and/or ability of 
‘organised’ criminals to exploit the virtual world) (McCusker, 2006; see also Levi, 
2001; Savona and Mignone, 2004; Holt and Copes, 2010). 
 First of all, while computer crime has been identified as the ‘new’ threat or the 
‘new’ frontier for law enforcement, policy makers, the media and an increasingly 
large number of academics, in reality the online trade in illicit medicines is largely 
based upon a set of established criminal acts: intellectual property crime (in the 
case of counterfeit medicines infringing IP laws) and fraud. McQuade (2011) 
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would define these criminal activities as adaptive in the sense that they constitute 
technological variations of ordinary crimes. Similarly, as Naylor (2000: 3) very 
characteristically puts it: 
 
“It is important to distinguish new crime from new methods. To take one com-
mon case, frequently “computer crime” is singled out as a prime new area of 
concern. But it really boils down to a series of traditional criminal acts . . . that 
happen today to be assisted by the use of computers. The crimes remain the 
same. The only difference is the technique used to commit them, and the ability 
to do them from much further away than was commonly the case” (see also 
Grabosky, 2001). 
 
However, what our research on the illegal e-trade of medicines highlights is that 
although the Internet might enable the “distancing of offenders from their illegal 
goods and services” (Levi and Naylor, 2000: 10; see also Filipkowski, 2004), it can 
also increase the authorities’ ability to detect the offences and offenders (see, for 
example, Coscia and Rios, 2012; Moore, 2007). 
 Moreover, this particular market emphasises that the illicit traders involved in 
marketing and supplying medicines online “resemble many professional criminals 
in their ‘adaptive pragmatic organisation’” (Shover et al., 2003: 501). These pro-
fessional criminals continue to evolve while responding to ‘shifting terrains’ 
(Hobbs, 2001), including new and frequently mutating technologies (see Levi, 
2002; Bequai, 2001) and strategies in law enforcement and security (von Lampe, 
2005). These “[e]conomic and social changes inevitably transform the worlds in 
which these professional criminals entertain options and organise for pursuit of 
criminal income” (Shover et al., 2003; see also Hobbs, 1995; 1997; 2013; Hall, 
2012). Indeed, the rise of the Internet is one factor working in conjunction with the 
non-digital dimension in a dynamic way, along with a variety of social, cultural, 
political and economic processes, to enable production and consumption of ‘fake’ 
medicines. The relationship existing between these economic and social changes, 
legal economies and illegal markets, online and offline ‘worlds’, is flexible and 
complex, and is manifested in the surrounding entrepreneurial landscapes and their 
elements (van Duyne, 2005; Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2014). In Bauman’s 
(1992) words, “[the] entrepreneurial ethic that underpins both legal and illegal per-
formances thrives upon new technical, social, psychological and existential skills” 
(Bauman, 1992), which in turn are bordered by new configurations of cultural and 
technological capital” (Shover et al., 2003: 502; see also Treadwell, 2011). 
 Our findings, however, highlight another key issue that merits attention, given 
the hype that accompanies internet-related crime. Ongoing legal and criminological 
research on cyber-crime is primarily concerned with diffusion and the ever increas-
ing criminal opportunities offered by the Internet (Hayward, 2012: 139). One 
would assume, therefore, that the Internet would allow many more criminal entre-
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preneurs to become involved in the process of illegally selling medicines online. 
Yet our study shows that various perpetrator roles may be found. It shows that the 
business is highly concentrated among a smaller number of individuals and groups 
operating on a wider scale, some of whom have a fair amount of IT knowledge and 
skill, or a team to which IT services can be contracted out. However, this finding 
may be problematic because it is the product of investigations by the authorities 
focusing on specific known illegal pharmacies. Therefore, it may neglect small-
scale actors who are involved in the illegal online trade of medicines (such as those 
we found during our ethnographic research). Overall, we have found that the actors 
involved in the online trade of ‘fake’ medicines and their operations exist on varied 
yet simultaneous scales; some are larger criminal organisations with pockets of 
concentrated power and reach (e.g. Glavmed) while others are small-scale national-
ly or locally based groups or individuals. This indicates that the market’s social 
composition does not change as a result of digitisation, and similar subjective de-
sires and demands emerge. 
 Finally, despite the ‘transnationality’ of this illegal market – in as much as it 
encompasses a multiplicity of interactions and linkages of individuals and institu-
tions across the borders of nation states – it also has national and local manifesta-
tions. Our research has shown that the illegal online sale of medicines is illustrative 
of the “counter-geographies of globalisation” (Sassen, 1998): the dynamic and 
fluid networks that are – to a considerable extent – part of the informal economy, 
but also use sectors of the legal economy’s ‘infrastructure’ and support across vari-
ous spatial scales. These networks are intertwined with the foremost dynamics 
constitutive of globalisation, such as the ‘formation of global markets’ and the 
establishment and intensification of ‘transnational and trans-local networks’, but 
these are coupled with a diversity of everyday grounded and localised economies 
(both legal and illicit) and occupational cultures in which the overall process of 
globalisation is embedded (Sassen, 1998; see also Hobbs, 1998). 
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